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Criminal Responsibility
By

SIDNEY

J.

KAPLAN*

is concerned with personal responsibility insofar as (1) it relates to the explanation of human behavior and (2)
as it has implications for criminal adjudication and punilhment.
'With regard to understanding behavior, the sociologist assumes
that behavior has a deterministic basis." That is, behavior, criminal or otherwise, is derived from a host of factors which have previously impinged and which continue to impinge upon the individual. In short, just as causality is by modern science imputed
to every "natural" phenomenon, so also is this same causality of
action imputed by the sociologist to human behavior. Upon this
assumption is predicated the sociologist's investigation of his subjects. This point of view, it may be added, is held currently by
the modern behavioral sciences.
Put in this gross fashion the nation of determinism is something of a contemporary commonplace. Developments in the behavioral sciences in the past one hundred years have made for a
general acknowledgement of determinism. But once the conceptual leap is made from determinism to responsibility in human
behavior the problem seems to be much less innocuous. Since, it
is argued, behavior is determined by antecedent conditions, in
what sense is the individual responsible for his actions? If an individual commits a crime, is this not the result of his biological
makeup and socialization which engendered in him desires, attitudes, motives and other reaction tendencies which inevitably
gave rise to the crime? Similarly with regard to the impetus to any
behavior be that behavior adjudged praiseworthy, blameworthy,
or neutral by society.
0 Ph.D., State College of Washington, Assistant Professor of Sociology, UniTHE SOCIOLOGIST

versity of Kentucky.
I The viewpoint offered here is essentially that of the so-called "Positive
school." See Ferri, Criminal Sociology pt. 7 (1917). A similar "orthodox' point
of view may be found in Waller, A Deterministic View of Criminal Responsibility,
20 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S.88 (1929). See also, Hospers, Free Will and Psychoanalysis in Readings in Ethical Theory 560 (Sellers and Hospers eds. 1952).
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Now if an individual is not responsible for his behavior in
what sense can society blame him, and secondly what justification
would there be for exacting punishment of a person who acts out
his "peculiar nature"? Logically, rooted as he is in determinism,
the sociologist must necessarily question the appropriateness of
such concepts as responsibility, blame, and punishment. And this
holds true not only for the very young and the "insane" categories
specifically recognized by the law as lacking responsibility, but
of all people. The premise of determinism must necessarily lead
to this conclusion, despite conventional attitudes to the contrary.
Having rejected the concepts of responsibility, blame, and
punishment, has not the sociologist defeated the avowed purpose
of the law? In other words, is not the assumption of human responsibility, if questionable philosophically, nonetheless a necessary ingredient of social control? Moreover, what of the entire
structure of criminal law? Is it not naive or even inane to reject
the corups of criminal law which, based upon centuries of accumulated human wisdom, embodies hard won criteria which safeguard not only society but the individual as well?
"Simplistic" as it may first appear, the sociologist nevertheless
asserts just that. Moreover, he questions the objection that personal responsibility is necessary in order to assure social control.
While he may reject personal responsibility he substitutes in its
stead what may be called "social accountability. '2 In short, just
as the community reserves the right to protect itself from any
danger, so too, society through its legal system takes such steps as
would insure its protection and at the same time preserve such
rights as may be ascribed to the individual. The individual, in
other words, even though not responsible for his acts is nonetheless held accountable for them, his disposition being made by such
tribunal as is legally constituted for that purpose. 3
While the above framework of determinism in an abstract
sense may be logically acceptable, there still remains a tremendous
gap between the broad framework and its translation into workable legal formulae. If for no other reason than this, traditional
2

Feni id. at 852 et. sec. See also Wood and Waite, Crime and Its Treatment

484 (1941).

SFor consideration of the several forms such a tribunal might take, see

Weihofen, Mental Disorder As a Criminal Defense c. 10 (1954).
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jurisprudence would find it to be not only "mere nonsense but
objectionable nonsense." 4
But even though at first appraisal this transparently gross
framework may seem impracticable legally, such an overarching
viewpoint, philosophically persuasive, and empirically founded
upon sociology, psychology, and particularly psychiatry, nevertheless can serve as a yardstick for the detailed legal interpretations,
modifications, and implementations that a rapidly changing society would seem to entail. That the deterministic viewpoint,
often in the guise of humanitarianism and practicality, has been incorporated in the law is clear. Probation, parole, the juvenile court,
the occasionally broad interpretation of the M'Naghten Rules,
the doctrines of irresistible impulse and diminished responsibility
and the recent Durham case indicate this to be so.5 Moreover, the
continual psychiatric-legal ferment of recent decades seems to bespeak an increasing acknowledgement of determinism.0
What is actually found in law is a marriage of responsibility
and determinism which alliance, at least to some philosophers and
sociologists, seems quite illegitimate, although from the legal point
of view a marriage of convenience whose empirical consequences
have much to commend it.7 To which the sociologist can reply,
"Yes, to the extent that determinism is incorporated in the law, to
that extent is the marriage to be commended. To the extent that
responsibility and its associated doctrines are retained is there
much to dispute with regard to convenience, practicality, and
other pragmatic justifications."
4

Ascribing this hypothetical reaction to jurisprudence may be entirely unwarranted. Determinism has already been incorporated in the law-with concrete
formulae-particularly for young offenders. Ibid.
5 See Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: from M'Naghten to Durham
to Beyond 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).
6 SeeWechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations of Its Model
Penal7 Code 42 A.B.A.J. 321 (1956).
Waller refers to the alliance of determinism and personal responsibility as
a hodgepodge, a melange, a collection of ill-assorted notions which are given
coherence by wishful thinking." Op. cit. supra at 91. A more temperate expression of the same criticism may be found in Ross, Foundations of Ethics c. 10
(1939). Says Ross, "A philosophical genius may some day arise who will succeed
in reconciling our natural thought about freedom and responsibility with the
acceptance of the laws of causality; but I admit that no existing discussions seem
to be very successful in doing so.' p. 251. On the other hand an avowed reconciliation may be found in Schlick, Problems of Ethics c. 7 (1939).
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Responsibility and Punishment
If determinism is ascribed to the criminal act then what basis
would society have for punishing a person? "That freedom of the
will is essential to criminal responsibility is a fundamental proposition recognized by every civilized penal system in the world.
There cannot be, and there is not, in any locality or age a law
punishing men for what they cannot avoid.""
The rationale for imputing responsibility is quite clear. The
law finds it necessary to charge liability or responsibility for a crime
in order that punishment may be applied. And why is punishment
invoked?
On the one hand punishment functions as retribution. It
serves to get back at the "perverse free will" and by exacting some
kind of pain affords society a sense of justice done. In fact, it may
be said that our legal code, influenced as it has been by theological doctrine, is permeated by retribution. 9 On the other hand,
a second function is also attached to punishment. It is maintained
that punishment by representing a threat to potential criminals
would serve as a deterrent to prevent additional crime. The basis
for assuming the efficacy of punishment (as a deterrent) is the doctrine of the freedom of the will.
According to this doctrine a person is free, at least to some
extent, to do as he pleases, and society in some way must
prevail upon him to bring his behavior into conformity
with generally accepted standards. When one violates the
law it is assumed that he might have acted otherwise if he
so desired. Therefore he is held not to have disciplined
himself sufficiently, and he deserves to be punished. He
must be taught a lesson, and others impressed by his experience, will choose to obey the law. 10
But what are the effects of punishment conceived of as deterrence? What have empirical studies of deterrence shown? In
short, does.punishment deter, and if it does is the validity of personal responsibility (free will) affirmed? On the other hand, if
8

Weihofen, op. cit. supra at 81. Quoted from judge Somerville in Parsons v.

State (1886) 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854. This quotation is offered as a legal point of
view.
For a criticism of "social positivists and their understanding of retribution,
see Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 352 et. seq. (1947).
10 Caldwell, Criminology 396 (1956).
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punishment does not deter does this vitiate the concept of responsibility and affirm the soundness of determinism?
Since capital punishment as a deterrent has been investigated
at length, there may be some merit in examining the effectiveness
of punishment in that context. Following this appraisal, however,
punishment in general will be considered."
As a prefactory note to the examination of the statistics of
capital crime, the following dramatic quotations would seem to be
noteworthy.
On June 21, 1877, ten men were hanged in Pennsylvania for
murderous conspiracy. The New York Herald predicted the
wholesome effect of the terrible lesson. "We may be certain," it said editorially, "that the pitiless severity of the law
will deter the most wicked from anything like the imitation
of these crimes." Yet the night after the large scale execution, two of the witnesses at the trial of these men had been
two weeks 5 of the prosecutors had
murdered, and within
2
met the same fate.1

In England in the 18th century, the brutal hangings were
public and almost like carnivals. Yet there was no evidence
that the crime rate declined. Indeed, pocket-picking became so common in the crowds assembled to witness the
public hanging3 of pick-pockets, that hangings had to be
made private.1

Admittedly the above accounts hardly serve as a basis for dismissing the efficacy of punishment as a deterrent, but they are
nonetheless of sufficient moment to make one deliberate before
glibly asserting the validity of punishment to deter.
More weight, however, may be attached to the statistics of
capital punishment. The deterrent effect of capital punishment
may in part be appraised by comparing states which make use of
capital punishment with those states with no such statutory provision. "In general, when the homicide rate in states which authorize the death penalty is compared with the homicide rate in other
states, it is found that the former states have a homicide rate two
or three times as great as the latter.'

14

"1
2 See p. 244, infra.

Barnes and Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology 356 (2d ed. 1951).
'3Id. at 358. Other considerations, it should be added, were involved in the

abolition of public hangings.
14 Sutherland

and Cressey, Principles of Criminology 292 (5th ed. 1955).
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More convincing, since geographically proximate states are
compared, are the inferences which may be drawn from the following table:
TABLE 2
ANNUAL AVERAGE HOMICIDE RATES IN FIFTEEN STATES
SELECTED ACCORDING TO CONTIGUITY

15

1931-85

1986-40

1941-46

Rhode Islanda ........................
Connecticut ............................
Michigana ..............................
Indiana ..................................
Wisconsina ............................
Illinois ....................................

1.8
2.4
5.0
6.2
2.4
9.6

1.5
2.0

1.0
1.9

3.6
4.3
1.7
5.7

3.4
3.2
1.5
4.4

Minnesotaa ............................
Iowa ........................................

8.1
2.6

1.7
1.7

1.6
1.3

Kansasb ..................................
Colorado ................................
M issouri ..................................
Nebraska ................................
Oklahoma ..............................
Arizona ..................................
New Mexico ..........................
I Abolition state.

6.2
7.5
11.1
3.7
11.0
12.6
12.5

3.6

3.0

5.5
6.6
1.7
7.2
10.3
8.4

8.7
5.3
1.8
5.6
6.5
5.3

b

Abolition between

1931 and 1985.

It may be noted that Rhode Island, which has abolished capital
punishment, has a homicide rate lower than that of Connecticut
where capital punishment still obtains. 16 In Michigan, too, despite
the absence of the death penalty, the rate is lower than the contiguous states of Indiana and Illinois. On the other hand, Wisconsin, without the death penalty for a hundred years, has a rate much
lower than that of Michigan. Reference to the Minnesota figure
shows a rate much like Iowa's, even though only Iowa has the
death penalty. The inference, then, to be drawn from this appraisal of adjacent states is that the homicide rate is quite irrelevant to the penalty which exists.
15 Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty, 284 Annals of
The American Academy of Political and Social Science 54, 58 (1952).
16 Id. at 57-58. This lengthy appraisal of the death penalty is a close paraphrase of Schuessler's analysis.
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An interesting before and after comparison may be made using
the homicide rates for Kansas and South Dakota. The death
penalty in Kansas was abolished in 1907, and reinstituted in 1935.
The rates of homicide was greater just prior to the imposition of
the death penalty in 1935 then subsequently. This would seem to
lend credence to the deterrent effect of the death penalty. But if
one notes the states adjacent to Kansas which maintained capital
punishment continuously, it may be seen that they too were
characterized by an decrease in homicide. "The experience of
Kansas, then, when viewed in context, merely emphasizes that
homicide trends are the resultant of social conditions17rather than
the resultant of changes in the death penalty policy.'
This inference is further reinforced by the figures for North
and South Dakota. South Dakota did not have the death penalty
between 1915 and 1939. North Dakota has not had capital punishment since 1915. Yet between 1930 and 1939 "the average
annual homicide rate in South Dakota dropped from 1.8 for the
period 1930-39 to 1.5 for the following ten-year period, while in
North Dakota the rate dropped from 1.8 to 1.l."18 Again, it may
be asserted that if a relationship exists between capital punishment
and homicide, such relationship is dubious. Indeed, in this latter
instance, North Dakota without the death penalty had a greater
drop in homicide rate than South Dakota, which had the death
penalty.
Similarly, on the basis of a survey of states having capital punishment and those not having capital punishment, and a comparison of cities in capital punishment states and non-capital punishment states, Wood and Waite assert that "no causal relationship
between the rate and the presence or absence of the death penalty
can be established. Rather, the homicide rate should be regarded
as a function of many social, economic, and demographic factors
in community life."'

9

In 1932 Vold sought to investigate the relationship between the
death penalty and homicide by appraising contiguous tiers of
counties in Iowa and Missouri. 20 In both Iowa and Missouri the
17Id. at 58.

18 Ibid.
Wood and Waite, op. cit. supra at 478.
o Vold, Can the Death Penalty Prevent Crime, The Prison journal, 3 Oct.
(1932).
219
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death penalty was in effect. His examination showed that a group
of ten southern Iowa counties had an average rate of 3.9, and a
northern group of eight Missouri counties had a rate of 3.5. But
a survey of twelve southern Missouri counties showed the average
rate to be 10.5. Both the northern Missouri counties and the
southern Iowa counties exhibited similarity in culture and population composition. On the other hand, the group of southern
Missouri counties (high rate) were markedly different culturally
from the other two county tiers specified. On that basis, Vold
argued that the rate of homicide was irrelevant to the death penalty which existed in both states.
But it may be maintained, with obvious justification, that
much more important than the existence of capital punishment
is the actual fact of execution. It is entirely possible that despite
the statutory provision for capital punishment few murderers may
be executed, thus nullifying the deterrent effect of the death
penalty. Schuessler, investigating the relationship between the
certainty of punishment and homicide, correlated the risk of
execution (the number of executions for murder per 1000 homicides) with rates of homicide in the capital punishment states.
"The correlation between these two indices was -. 26, indicating
a slight tendency for the homicide rate to diminish as the probability of execution increases." 2 1 Moreover, on the basis of additional statistical analysis Schuessler asserted that:
This evidence, included primarily because of its suggestiveness must be classed as negative from the standpoint of
deterrence theory since (a) the homicide rate does not drop
consistently as the certainty of the death penalty increases,
and (b) the geographic correlation between risk of execution and the homicide rate is not impressive, failing to reach
the 5 per cent level and statistically accounting for22only 7
per cent (R2 ) of the variability of the homicide rate.
Also, by comparing the probability of execution and the homicide
rate in terms of time series analysis by establishing a one-year time
lag between the two indices on the basis that deterrence assumes
that the execution of the death penalty will be followed by a
reduction in homicide rate, Schuessler computed a number of cor21 Schuessler, op. cit. supra at 59-60.
22d. at 60.
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relation'coefficients which suggested that the two time series were
independent of one another: ". . . this evidence fails to substantiate the belief that the deterrent influence of the death penalty is enhanced by its frequent use, as changes in homicide rate
way to variations in the probdo not correspond in a systematic
' 23
used.
being
its
ability of
There are still additional figures to make one skeptical of the
efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent. These statistics relate
to European experiences with capital punishment. According to
Sutherland and Cressey, European countries which have discontinued application of capital punishment have a lower rate of
homicide than countries retaining it.24 England, with the death
penalty, has a homicide rate twice that of the Scandinavian countries, which do not have the death penalty. A before and after
analysis of Sweden and The Netherlands also demonstrates that
25
the death penalty is unrelated to the rate of homicide.
But it may be argued that homicide is a special kind of crime,
and in such cases where passion often plays a part, one would not
expect to find deterrence effective. Yet Rusche and Kirsheimer on
the basis of French, German, and Italian figures for a variety of
crimes (fraud, larceny, assault, embezzlement, etc.) claim that
there is no relationship between punishment and the general
crime rate:
Our investigation has thus substantiated on a still broader
basis the conclusions which Ferri reached at the end of the
19th century on the basis of Italian experience, that the
policy of punishment has no effective influence on the rate
of crime. Changes in penal praxis cannot seriously interfere
with the social causes of delinquency. If the effects of the
policy of punishment could be isolated, that is to say, if
they could be examined in a period of complete social and
political stability, then it might be possible to discover a
certain measure of influence. This very necessity for isolation, however, itself reveals, the social irrelevance of methods of26punishment as a factor in determining the rate of
crime.

24 Sutherland and Cressey, op. cit. supra at 294.

28bid.
25 Schuessler, op. cit. supra at 58-59.
26
Rusche and Kirchheimer, Punishment and the Social Structure 204-205
(1939).
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Aside from the statistical analysis of the relationship between
punishment and the rate of crime, several considerations, already
discussed lend weight to the arguments for nonresponsibility. One
of these considerations is the overwhelming impact of the psychiatric literature. Despite controversies, and despite in many instances the absence of respectable scientific control, the clinical
findings are irresistably persuasive. The fact that the law acknowledges the psychiatric body of knowledge is to some extent testimony to modern day acceptance of psychiatric findings. Similarly,
the use of clinics staffed with psychologists, psychiatrists and social
workers as adjuncts of the courts testifies to that general acknowl27
edgement.
The law to be sure, provides exemptions for responsibility
in extreme cases of mental unbalance, but for all others
shifts to an assumption of full or partial responsibility.
There is little confirmation of this in modem psychology
and psychiatry which recognizes no sharp breaks between
the mental processes of the normal and the so-called abnormal personality.28
When the law recognize nonresponsibility it does so in those
cases which are obviously extreme. What it fails to do is to acknowledge the entire body of psychological and sociological knowledge which relates to the processes of personality development.
This writer then, in consideration of the substance of social-psychological thought, and the persuasive character of the statistics
relating to punishment and crime, must align himself with those
who affirm the case for determinism and deny the argument for
free will.
In sum, this writer rejects the philosophical notion of the free
will and its concomitant of responsibility and embraces what
appear to be the sounder conceptions of psychological and physical determinism. And determinism asserts that a person does
not act other than he does, simply because he is "conditioned by
a variety of inner and outer circumstances which may outweigh
any latent fear of punishment." 29
27 Guttmacher, The Status of the Adult Court Psychiatric Clinics, 1 No. 2.
N.P.P.A. Journal 97 (1955).
28Wood and Waite, op. cit. supra at 480.
29 Tbid.
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But does this mean that deterrence is not operative at all?30
Does this not belie common sense? Consider the not uncommon
situation that occurs when a tornado or flood strikes a community?
Doesn't looting take place and is this not so because of the break
down in law enforcement, that is, absence of the deterrent? Yet
the more significant point is that most people despite the absence
of the deterrent do not loot. If some loot stores it is not because
of the action of a free unencumbered will, but because the individuals concerned have not incorporated the values of the community. In other words, their conditioning was such that given
the situation of open shops and general chaos, they simply "acted
out their natures." The cynic might add that each man has his
price, and while at first consideration this would seem to confirm
free will, it rather contradicts it. What it means is that each person has been so socialized that he responds in a way (or at a price)
which is peculiar to his nature. What is indicated then is not punishment which is often no more than retribution, but relearning,
or to use the common term, rehabilitation. Now punishment is
denied as being efficacious only in the sense that it is retribution.
Punishment as part of the relearning process may be effective.3 '
This may appear to be a semantic twist to ensure that the determinist is bound to have his cake and eat it too; but suffice it to
say, however, that it is logically consistent and is in conformance
with inferences drawn from psychological and sociological research.
Responsibility and "Insanity"
A factor hitherto merely alluded to is the matter of community
reaction. It may be maintained with some social-psychological
a refutation of hedonistic psychology and its conceptions is probably
not sufficient to justify the rejection of the broader aspects of the deterrence
argument. In a broader perspective, the criminal law and its application by police
and courts probably have great effects upon public morality. Although specific
severe punishments may have little immediate demonstrable effect in deterring
specific criminals, the existence of the criminal code with its penal sanctions probably
has ,aSutherland
long run deterrent
effect
the development of criminalistic
ideologies."
and Cressey,
op. upon
cit. supra at 289.
31 'Probably no one advocates abolishing a unpleasant forms of dealing with
criminals. There are cases where disciplinary measures are necessary and beneficial; and with incorrigible or incurable offenders indeterminate incarceration
may be the only thing possible. The point is that the criminologist would inflict
discipline and suffering, not under the assumption that 'justice' or morality demand
that 'he who sins must suffer,' but only because they seem necessary for the
person's own rehabilitation or for the protection of society." Weihofen, op. cit.
supra at 486.
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justification that punishment tends to restore the community's
sense of social solidarity. 32 Presumably the criminal's act makes
for a psychic imbalance and the punishment functions as a catharsis which reinstitutes society's sense of integrity. Society is thus
buttressed on two counts by punishment. On the one hand, the
criminal may be safely locked up, and on the other hand a kind
of psychological closure ensues.
That societal reaction is a major consideration in the processes
of law is a trite observation. The criminal law functions to protect
society with due recognition for the right of the individual. In
short, we have as a backdrop the conflict between the individual
and society. And in case of doubt, ignorance, or fear, there seems
to be little question that society takes it upon itself to ensure its
security. This consideration raises a knotty problem which superficially at least would seem to vitiate the previous discussion of
punishment and responsibility.
While logically and empirically the case for determinism is a
substantial one, it cannot be denied that (1) social expedience may
be necessary which from the long range point of view may appear
illogical, and (2) the scientific knowledge at our disposal is full
of gaps which might make implementation of policies based exclusively upon determinism questionable from a practical point
of view. It is interesting to note that Moreland in making a
recommendation prefaces his comment with an acknowledgement
of its unscientific and illogical basis.3 3
Society, then, acts in the light of existent knowledge to safeguard itself and its hard won legal rights, despite the compelling
implications of determinism and sociological and psychological
3

2

A very ingenious argument for the appropriateness of responsibility and as-

sociated doctrines (despite their admitted scientific inadequacies) is offered by Thurman Arnold. In essence he suggests that the "folklore' of responsibility serves the
very important function of maintaining social solidarity. Trials and punishment are

important, then, insofar as they reafrm the ideals of society, and by so doing, renforce popular belief in law and order. See Hill, The Psychological Realism of
Thurman Arnold 22 The University of Chicago Law Review 877 (1955). A point
of view similar in implication is found in the following comment by Holmes: "If
I were having a philosophical t
with a man I was going to have hanged (or
electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but
to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common
good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like.
But the law must keep its promises." Katz, Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will 22
The University of Chicago Law Review 397 402 (1955). Quoted from HolmesLaski Letters 806 (Howe ed. 1953).
33 See Moreland, Mental Responsibility and the Criminal Law-A Defense,
p. 215 of this journal.
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research. This truism is particularly germane to the problem of
responsibility and insanity.
From the deterministic viewpoint insanity would present no
departure from the suggestions offered in the first part of this
paper. That is, no criminal would be regarded as responsible and
the insane criminal would be disposed of in terms of his social
accountability. Davidson, in his discussion of criminal responsibility appraises the several formulae which might be used to define responsibility and offers the following cogent comment with
regard to determinism (crime treated as a disease) :
This is a very attractive thesis. It has a rigorous logic about
it which is appealing. Normal people don't commit crimes,
since, generally speaking, criminal behavior being deviant
behavior is abnormal behavior. Therefore it follows that all
criminals are abnormal. Since sickness is the term we doctors use as a criterion of abnormality it again follows that
all criminals are sick, and the way to handle criminals is to
treat them as sick men.
As applied to deviant behavior, this thesis would
wipe out the doctrine of personal responsibility. Society is
not ready yet to buy this, nor are we psychiatrists quite
ready to pay off on the promise that we have the cure to
crime. 34
Given the current legal frame of reference, the importance of
due process including the jury trial, public opinion, and the acknowledged lack of scientific knowledge, one, on pragmatic
grounds is led perhaps to be hesitant about accepting a framework
of determinism. Realistically, one should expect no such marked
change. Yet the dicta of Judge Bazelon in the Durham case may
have wider ramifications than anticipated.
Conclusion
Perhaps the sociologist is beating a dead horse when he recommends a framework of determinism. The law has in fact in many
specific instances embraced determinism. The problem may be
rather how far the concept of determinism should be extended.
"The basic philosophy of the new approach has already been
84 Davidson, Criminal Responsibility: The Quest for a Formula in Psychiatry
and the Law 66 (Hoch and Zubin eds. 1955).
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adopted in a growing number of specific situations, so that its general acceptance now would merely be an extension to all cases of
what already is being done in many."3 5
Now what would a complete extension of this approach mean
with regard to crime and punishment?
If this approach were adopted it would, among other effects,
practically eliminate the defense of insanity. The jury, its
function restricted to deciding whether the accused committed the act charged, would no longer have to consider
the state of mind with which the act was done. All offenders
would be accorded the kind of therapeutic or custodial care
appropriate to their individual cases. Those suffering from
mental illness would be sent to a mental institution-which
is what usually happens under a successful insanity plea
anyway. But such illness, instead of being taken into account in determining whether the defendant was 'guilty' or
not, would enter into consideration only in deciding what to
do with him. In short, this approach would largely abolish
the concept of criminal responsibility."0
Any crime then would entail a reaction on the part of society
which would serve to protect it. Society, recognizing the danger
of any criminal would take the criminal in custody and make such
disposition as the character of criminal and the protection of
society dictated. And this latter function could be performed by
a "dispositional tribunal" which would have access to contem37
porary psychological and sociological resources.
This procedure then would not do violence to society's need
for protection since, if need be, the criminal would be put in
custody. Moreover since the assumption of the deterrence value
of punishment is dubious, little would be lost in that regard. But
what of the criminal's residual rights? Suppose, found "guilty,"
he were sent to some appropriate institution. Would he be protected from being incarcerated for too long a period of time? In
this case, protection would be afforded by legal provision for
periodic appraisal of the criminal. And at such time as the examiners felt the individual ready for release-the protection of
society being kept uppermost-he would be discharged, and if
85 Weihofen, op. cit. supra at 486.

so Id. at 482.

27Id. at 480-482.

250
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necessary, with the kind of extra-institutional supervision indicated. That this is not a simple problem is obvious. Criteria for
release would have to be formulated so that an individual incarcerated for a relatively minor offense, ostensibly "incurable,"
would not be permanently institutionalized. Both public tolerance and "an adequate body of therapeutic knowledge" would be
crucial in this regard.
Such a procedure is by no means new. In the Youth Correction
Authority Act of the American Law Institute such ideas are already embodied, and implemented, it may be added, in current
juvenile court practice. And in the Maryland Defective Delinquent Law there is provision, at least for socially "dangerous"
criminals, for a similar "therapeutic" treatment. The departure,
then, is not so much in terms of theory or practice, but rather in
terms of extension to criminality in general.

